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1. Introduction 
 
Consider an individual who inherits a forest. Year by year, under the auspices of Mother 
Nature, the forest grows.  The individual has to choose how much wood to consume 
during his lifetime and how much of the forest to bequeath to his children. What governs 
the choice? Given the parameters that impinge on the individual’s choice, what 
determines the intra- and inter-generational consumption paths? In the long run, when 
evolutionary pressures manifest themselves, which parameter configuration is likely to 
prevail? 
 
 Several studies have addressed the topic of (resource) allocation across 
generations and the appropriate generational weights associated with such an allocation.  
Arrow (1973) and Dasgupta (1974) use a “private” utility function of parents and their 
offspring to form the following welfare function of the t period generation: 
å
=
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m
i
itit cUW
0
)(b where i denotes generation, )( itcU + denotes the utility of the t+i 
generation from consumption, m is the number of the generations that the t period 
generation accounts for (in Dasgupta’s model m=1), and 1£ib  is the generational 
discount rate such that  1+³ ii bb .  What constitutes the ib ’s is not specified.  Barro 
(1974) models the altruistic concern of individuals for the welfare of their  offspring in 
an overlapping generations economy where the planning horizon extends to infinity and 
population size is fixed.  The utility function of a member of the i-th generation is given 
by )),,(( *1+= i
o
i
y
ii UccUU  where 
o
ic  is consumption of the old in generation i, 
y
ic is 
consumption of the young (the offspring) in generation i, and *1+iU  is the optimal utility 
of the offspring in the next generation.  What governs the explicit form of U ),( *1+× iU  is 
not expounded.  Barro and Becker (1989) use a linear multi-generational utility of 
altruistic individuals with several offspring where the planning horizon extends to 
infinity. Utility is defined as 1)()( ++= iiiii UnnacVU , where i is the generational index, 
ci is individual i’s own consumption, V(ci) is the individual’s direct utility from his 
consumption, ni is the number of children the individual has, a(ni) is the degree of 
altruism of the individual toward each of his children, and 1+iU is the utility attained by 
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each child.  While this formulation sheds more light on what underlies inter-generational 
weighting and discounting, what forms the a(ni)  weight is not characterized. 
 
 In this paper we use a piecewise continuous utility function that is akin to the 
time discrete utility functions of Arrow, and Barro and Becker.  However, our function 
differs from theirs in that it is defined over a composite separable measure of inter-
generational altruism and intra-generational impatience.  Unlike Barro, and Barro and 
Becker, we define a preference order which is not confined to a planning horizon that 
extends to infinity.  The planning horizon itself is a preference parameter that impinges 
on consumption and on bequests.  In addition, we closely analyze the roles of altruism 
and impatience in an evolutionary environment.  In particular, we model the long-term 
time preferences and the choices of individuals who are both impatient (Koopmans 1960) 
and altruistic (Barro and Becker) toward their children. 
 
 We inquire how the individual’s preferences that incorporate intertemporal 
altruism, intratemporal impatience, and intertemporal farsightedness determine the 
individual’s consumption and bequest. We construct a model that enables us to derive 
the individual’s optimal level of consumption, optimal consumption path, and optimal 
bequest. We show how these magnitudes relate to a composite measure of altruism and 
impatience, and why altruism and patience fulfill similar intertemporal roles. We present 
conditions under which, in the life of a dynasty, bequests are higher than inheritances; 
altruism penalizes consumption of early generations but enhances consumption of late 
generations; and holding age constant, consumption rises in the generational order. In 
particular, we show that although in the short run, members of a dynasty emanating 
from, and replicating the preferences of, an individual who is more altruistic face a lower 
level of consumption than members of a dynasty emanating from a less altruistic 
individual, in the long run members of the former dynasty inherit, consume, and 
bequeath more than members of the latter dynasty. This finding prompts us to conjecture 
that since higher altruism confers an evolutionary edge in the long run, an altruistic 
inclination can become the prevailing trait in a population.  We derive a similar 
conjecture with regard to patience. 
 
 Three studies, Weil (1987), Vidal (1996), and Dutta and Michel (1998), address 
topics that bear closely on the issues we investigate yet obtain results that differ 
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somewhat from ours. It is useful to highlight briefly the similarities and denote the 
differences. 
 
 Weil studies consumption dynamics in an economy characterized by overlapping 
generations with a bequest motive (parents care about their children’s utility) and 
investigates the applicability of Barro’s (1974) debt neutrality proposition. Building on 
Weil’s model, Vidal studies the long-run distribution of dynasties (social classes) in an 
economy characterized by heterogeneity across dynasties in the altruism parameter. In 
these models, the optimal bequest appears to be negatively related to a measure of 
patience. This result seems to contrast with our finding, and for that matter with Becker’s 
(1980) finding long before us. The reason for the difference lies in the fact that our 
equivalent of the inter-generational discount factor of Weil and Vidal is a composite 
measure of altruism and impatience (and implicitly also of fertility). It can be 
demonstrated that when such a measure is incorporated in the models of Weil and Vidal, 
bequests are positively related to patience.1 (In the hybrid model we also show that 
Weil’s result that the long-run interest rate does not depend on the intertemporal discount 
factor but only on the inter-generational discount factor warrants a modification.) 
 
 Our model is free from the requirement of an operative bequest constraint 
discussed in Weil, Vidal, Becker and many others, because ours is a dynamically 
efficient economy wherein the shadow price of capital is equal to the rate of return to 
capital (given by the forest growth rate), and is independent of the value of the altruism 
parameter. An operative bequest constraint needs to be incorporated when the economy 
is dynamically inefficient. Note that if each individual can survive on wage earnings 
alone, an optimizing individual whose inter-generational discount factor is low could 
well prefer to leave a negative bequest, should this be feasable. 
 
 Becker and Vidal show that in the long run all capital ends up in the hands of the 
class of dynasties whose inter-generational discount factor is the highest. All other 
dynasties live on wages alone, leaving and receiving no bequests. In contrast, because 
our model assumes that owning capital is necessary for survival, we find that in the long 
                                                          
1 The structure of a “hybrid” model and a detailed derivation of the results are available from the 
   authors upon request. 
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run most of the capital ends up in the hands of the most altruistic dynasties, with strictly 
positive quantities of capital distributed (unequally) across the other dynasties. 
 
 Dutta and Michel present a model wherein heterogeneity in preferences arises 
intertemporally within dynasties but not across dynasties. This model differs from the 
concept of heterogeneity in ours (or, for that matter, in Vidal’s model). In Dutta and 
Michel’s population of dynasties, the inter-generational discount in each dynasty – a 
measure of altruism – can take one of two arbitrary values: 1 and 0. In the long run the 
proportion of altruists in the population is constant and the wealth distribution is 
stationary. The stationary equilibrium wealth distribution in Dutta and Michel’s model 
can be degenerate, implying perfect equality. In our setting, however, there is a growing 
dispersion of wealth. 
 
 
2. Preliminaries 
 
We consider a forward-looking individual. The individual has a long-term utility 
function defined over a multi-generational horizon. N is the number of generations ahead 
the individual considers. It measures the individual’s ability or proclivity to imagine and 
relate to the future. The length of the life span of a generation (the generation’s lifetime) 
is normalized as 1.  
 
 To simplify, we assume that every individual has one child and that every child 
has one parent. Let a denote the inter-generational weight the individual assigns to the 
utility of his child.  It is a measure of the individual’s altruism toward his descendant. 
We discuss the upper bound of a in section 3. 
 
 Let U be the individual’s long-term utility function. It is the sum of the 
generational utility functions, Wn, n = 0,1,2,...,N , 
 å
=
=
N
n
nWU
0
. (1) 
 
W0  is the utility the individual derives from consumption throughout his own lifetime, 
W1 is the utility of the individual from the consumption of his child,  and so on. 
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 The utility of the individual from the consumption of his n-th removed 
descendant, Wn, is defined as follows: 
 ( )ò
+
=
-=
1n
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n dtcueW
da  ,,...,1,0 Nn =  (2) 
where u(ct) is an intra-generational concave utility function, defined over timely 
consumption, ct, and t stands for time.  d > 0  is the individual’s degree of impatience. 
It captures the individual’s pure subjective discounting of future consumption. (If       
d = 0,  an optimizing individual may elect to postpone consumption in a manner that 
can endanger his own life and thereby the very continuity of his dynasty.)  na  
measures the weight the individual assigns to the utility of his n-th descendant. The 
individual is of the opinion that the utility weights assigned by his descendants and 
their degree of impatience mimic his. 
 
 The equivalent measure in our model to the time discrete generational 
discount factor of Arrow (bi) and of Barro and Becker (a(ni)) is d-ae , a composite 
measure of inter-generational altruism and intra-generational impatience. 2   Like 
Arrow’s model, but unlike Barro and Becker’s, our model is not confined to a 
farsightedness measure that tends to infinity.  (Note that the utility function U is 
complete, reflexive, transitive, continuous, and strongly monotonic iff ( )tcu  is 
complete, reflexive, transitive, continuous, and strongly monotonic for all ct.) 
 
 Let Kt measure the consumption source at time t. The individual’s starting 
endowment (the forest bequeathed to him), K0 , is given. Let the constant, exogenous, 
and given rate of return (the forest growth rate) be r. The dynamics of K is: 
         ttt crKdtdK -=  10 +££ Nt  . (3) 
Let In denote the present value of the consumption in generation n, 
 ò
+
=
-=
1n
nt
t
rt
n dtceI  .,...,1,0 Nn =  (4) 
                                                          
2 This can be seen most clearly from a rewrite of (2) as ( )ò
+
=
---=
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dda . 
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Since the sum of the present values of all generational consumptions cannot exceed the 
individual’s starting endowment, we have 
 å
=
³
N
n
nIK
0
0 .  (5) 
 
Denote by H1 the present value of the consumption source the individual bequeaths to 
his descendants. Then 
 1001 KeIKH
r-=-=  ,  (6) 
where K1 is the value of the consumption source at the time of the individual’s passing. 
 
3. The Piecewise Continuous Maximization Problem 
 
The individual wishes to maximize his long-term utility. His decision variables are ct, for 
10 ££ t , and H1, the present value of the bequest he leaves behind. In order to calculate 
the optimal value of H1 the individual maximizes his long-term utility function, over ct, 
for the time horizon 10 +££ Nt .  The target functional, J, is 
 ( )å òa=
=
+
=
d-
N
n
n
nt
t
tn dtcueJ
0
1
.  (7) 
The target functional is maximized over tc  for all t’s under consideration, subject to the 
state equation (3) and the starting endowment 0K . 
 
 In the Appendix, the maximization problem is solved in two steps. In the first 
step the optimal allocation of ct within each of the 1+N  generations is calculated, 
assuming that the values of NnIn ,...,1,0, =  are given, and subject to equation (4). In the 
second step, the optimal values of In are calculated, given the consumption allocations 
obtained in the first optimization step.  
 
 The optimal values of ct (given by Appendix equation (A8)) and In (given by 
Appendix equation (A12)) are 
 
 
( )
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and 
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a
, (9) 
 
and the present value of the individual’s bequest, H1, (given by Appendix equation 
(A13)) is  
 
 úû
ù
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è
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nneKIKH
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0001 11
da . (10) 
 
 Our framework implies an upper limit of the altruism coefficient. It is clear from 
equation (10) that the sum å
=
-
N
n
nne
0
da  must be finite. Otherwise, the present value of 
what the individual bequeaths,  1H , is equal to his starting endowment, Ko , rendering the 
present value of his consumption 00 =I , thus jeopardizing his life. Since we admit 
¥®N , da -e  must be strictly smaller than 1 to ensure a finite sum, that is, a must be 
strictly smaller than ed. (Since d is strictly positive, 1>de ). If we restrict the discussion 
to values of a  that do not exceed 1, the sum in question will be finite for any 0>d .3 
 
 What is the value of the consumption source, K1, at time 1=t  when the bequest 
is made? From (6) and (10) it follows that the (time consistent) value is      
 ú
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3 Having assumed that 1<-dae , å
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da is the sum of a geometric series. For a large N  this sum 
   tends from below to ( ) 11 1 <- --dae . Therefore,    ( )[ ] dd aa -- =--= eKeKH 0101 1/11    and 
   hence,  010 KH << ;   the present value  of  the  consumption  source that the individual optimally 
   bequeathes is strictly positive. 
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The optimal value of K1  depends on the altruism coefficient, a ; the planning horizon, 
N; the degree of impatience, d ; and the exogenous rate of return, r. In particular, 
 
 K1 is positively related to the altruism coefficient: 
 0
0
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The higher the weight the individual attaches to the wellbeing of his child, the larger the 
bequest to the child. We can also sign the other three dependencies. 
 
 K1 is positively related to the planning horizon: 
 0
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The longer the planning horizon, the larger the bequest. 
 
 In addition, K1 is negatively related to the individual’s degree of impatience: 
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The role of impatience in inter-generational transfers is similar to the role of impatience 
in intra-generational transfers; higher impatience entails leaving less to the future.  
 
 Finally, K1 is positively related to the rate of return: 
 011 >=¶¶ KrK . (15) 
A higher rate of return confers a higher yield  which facilitates a larger inter-generational 
transfer. 
 
4. Implications 
 
What can we learn from our modeling framework about the relationship between the 
inheritance received by the individual, K0, and the bequest made by him, K1? Using (11) 
we obtain 
 011 01
0
01 >=úû
ù
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÷
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æ-=¶¶ å
=
- KKeeKK
N
n
nnr da . (16) 
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Thus, an optimizing individual who receives a larger K0 ends up leaving a larger K1. 
What might have been attributed to an abstract notion of fairness appears to arise from 
hard-nosed optimization. Moreover, we can determine under which configuration of 
parameters K1 will be larger than K0. For such a relationship to hold, the right-hand side 
of (16) has to be larger than 1, that is, 
 ( )å
=
--- ->
N
n
rnn ee
0
1
1da . (17) 
This relationship is more likely to hold the larger is a, the larger is N, the smaller is d, 
and the larger is r.  
 
 By evaluating (11) at ¥®N  we obtain   
 da -= re
K
K
0
1 . (18) 
We have that a must be equal to re -d  for K1 to be equal to K0. Whenever r=d , a must 
be equal to 1 in order for K1 to be equal to K0. However, if 1<a  “inter-generational 
equality” is obtained iff the rate of return exceeds the degree of impatience. This result 
can be reasoned as follows. Inter-generational mental discounting is a composite 
measure of impatience and altruism. Inter-generational equality is obtained whenever 
mental discounting, given by ae-d, is equal to the exogenous discounting given by e-r. 
From (18) we also see that since both a large a and a low d operate in the direction of 
raising 01 KK , 01 KK >  can be maintained for a lower a if d is lower or, for a higher d 
(but not as high as r) if a is higher.  
  
 We next ask: Does an individual who is more altruistic toward his descendants 
consume less than one who is less altruistic (so as to facilitate a larger bequest)? And yet, 
in the long run, do those dynasties characterized by a higher altruism coefficient 
consume more because generation after generation the inheritances received are larger? 
  
 To answer the first question, we rewrite ct  (substituting the optimal value of I0 
from (9) into the consumption function (8)) to obtain 
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Differentiating ct with respect to the altruism coefficient and evaluating the derivative at 
0=n  gives  
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Consequently, the answer to our first question is that a more altruistic (first generation) 
individual does indeed consume less. 
 
 As to our second question, note that the individual’s descendant, 1=n , benefits 
from his parent’s higher altruism since the descendant’s consumption positively relates 
to K1,
4 and K1, in turn, positively relates to the individual’s altruism (recalling equation 
(12)).  However, other things remaining the same, the descendant’s consumption is 
penalized by his higher altruism.  The bequest he leaves, K2, gains from being positively 
related to K1, as well as from the descendant’s heightened altruism.  The consumption of 
the next descendant down thus gains from the higher altruism of the preceding two 
generations, while it is penalized by the second descendant’s own increased altruism.  
Suppose that this reasoning is iterated period after period well into the future. The 
consumption of the n-th descendant gains from the higher altruism of all the preceding n-
1 generations, and is penalized by the n-th descendant’s own increased altruism.  We can 
now visualize the intra-generational consumption profile in a dynasty emanating from an 
individual whose a is high, as opposed to the intra-generational consumption profile in a 
dynasty emanating from an individual whose a is relatively low. Starting with the 
“founding” individuals, the consumption profile of the first dynasty will be steeper and 
will cut from below the consumption profile of the second dynasty. Moreover, several 
generations later, a member of the first dynasty will not only consume more during his 
lifetime than a member of the second dynasty, but will also bequeath more.  
 
 To trace the dynamics of consumption as ¥®N  we rewrite ct once more 
(drawing on Appendix equations (A5) and (A7), and  on (9)) to obtain 
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4 From (19) we get that ct positively relates to Ko, and from (16) we have that K1 positively related to 
K0.  Hence ct positively relates to K1. 
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We see that the consumption of an individual depends upon the generation he belongs to 
(n) and upon his age (t-n).  (Note that ( ) ( ) ( )( )ntrnrtr eee ---- = ddd .) In particular, the 
consumption ratio for two individuals of the same age across any two successive 
generations is given by da -re . Hence, if 1>-da re , consumption for any given age rises 
in the generational order. The dynamics of the intra-generational consumption is 
determined by the relationship between the impatience coefficient and the rate of return: 
whenever r<d , consumption rises during an individual’s lifetime ; whenever r=d , 
the intra-generational consumption is constant in age; and whenever r>d  consumption 
is negatively related to age.  
 
 
 To study the evolution of the consumption of dynasties with different degrees of 
altruism as ¥®N , we differentiate ct in (21) with respect to a to obtain 
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The right-hand side of (22) is negative for 0=n  but becomes positive for 
( )dd aa -- -> een 1 ; stronger altruism penalizes consumption early in the life of a 
dynasty but enhances it from some future time.  
 
 Let ( )21  ,aav  denote the index of the generation at which the consumption of a 
dynasty with a higher altruism coefficient, 1a , first surpasses the consumption of a 
dynasty with a lower altruism coefficient, 2a ; v is the smallest natural number for which 
( )1avc  exceeds ( )2avc . Using (21) we obtain 
 ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]( )21
12
21 11 ,
aa
aa
aa
dd
ln
eeln
v
-- --
³  ,...,,v 321=  . (23)  
Note that ( )21,aav  exists, it is positive, and it is finite for all 11 £a . Figure 1 compares 
the evolution of the inter-generational consumptions of the two dynasties. The figure is 
drawn for 1>-da rie , and 21 aa > . The first generation of the dynasty with the higher 
altruism coefficient consumes less than the first generation of the dynasty with the low 
altruism coefficient. However, the growth of consumption across generations, holding 
age constant, which is given by da -re , is positively related to the degree of altruism.  
Therefore, after the first 1-v  generations, the consumption of a dynasty characterized 
by high altruism exceeds the consumption of a dynasty characterized by low altruism.  
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 To study the evolution of the consumption of dynasties with different degrees of 
impatience as ¥®N , we mimic the steps we have taken to study the role of different 
degrees of altruism. 
  
 By differentiating ct in (21) with respect to d  we obtain 
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Since dd +>1e  for all positive values of d , 0)1( >-- -- dd d ee .  Thus, d¶¶ /tc  is 
positive at t = 0, the beginning of the individual’s life, but for t  td, where td  satisfies 
 
 ,)]1()1[(/)]1()1)(1[( dddddddd aadda
------ ---+---> eeeeeeet  (25) 
 
d¶¶ /tc  turns negative. Note that td exists and is finite. Impatience has both intra-
generational and inter-generational effects.  Greater impatience gives added weight to 
the individual’s immediate consumption which can be highly beneficial to the 
individual’s survival.  Greater patience relegates more consumption to the future at the 
expense of earlier consumption.  From some future point in time (which may or may not 
fall within the individual’s own lifetime), greater patience enhances the consumption of 
the individual’s dynasty.  Note that if a = 0, all the benefits from greater patience are 
reaped by the individual during his own lifetime.  (Future generations cannot possibly 
enjoy the fruits of the individual’s greater patience if the individual is not altruistic.) 
 
 To track more closely the inter-generational role of patience we compare the 
consumption of a dynasty with a lower impatience rate, d1, with the consumption of a 
dynasty with a higher impatience rate, d2 .  Let h = 0,1,2,… denote the index of the 
generation at which the consumption of the dynasty with d1 first surpasses the 
consumption of the dynasty with d2.  Using equation (21), we get 
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Note that  ),( 21 ddhh = exists and is finite for all feasible values of a  and d . 
 
 We conclude that after an initial, finite period during which consumption is taxed 
by greater patience, dynastic consumption benefits from enhanced patience.  In addition, 
the impatience rate that maximizes dynastic consumption tends to zero. 
 
 Pulling together the results from the analyses of the effects of a stronger altruism 
and a greater patience we see that in the inter-generational context, the altruism and 
patience of the founder of a dynasty and the replication of that altruism and patience by 
his descendants pay off. Not only are bequests higher but in successive generations and 
thereafter, all dynasty members enjoy higher levels of consumption than members of a 
dynasty whose founder was less altruistic and patient.  From some generation on, 
consuming more is congruent with bequeathing (hence inheriting) more, not at the 
expense of bequeathing (hence inheriting) less.  In addition, the value of altruism that 
maximizes the consumption of a dynasty differs from the value of altruism that 
maximizes the consumption of the individual. Moreover, the value of impatience that 
maximizes the consumption of a dynasty differs from the value of impatience that 
maximizes the consumption of the individual. 
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5. Conclusions 
  
Economists, biologists, philosophers, and others have long pondered whether altruism is 
detrimental to survival or whether it confers a survival advantage. If consumption 
positively affects the probability of survival, a dynasty whose members consume more 
will have an edge over a dynasty whose members consume less, such that in the long run 
the first dynasty’s chances of survival are higher. Our analysis points to the positive role 
of altruism in this regard. Indeed, the longer the long run, the more pronounced the edge 
(the wider is the inter-dynasties consumption wedge). It follows then that in a short-lived 
society the share of low-empathy individuals will be higher than in a long-lived society: 
the share of altruists in a society correlates positively with its age. Note, however, that if 
the likelihood of awfully bad states of nature occurring in the short run (that is, before 
the altruism-induced and the patience-induced advantages kick in) is high, which 
hitherto we have implicitly assumed not to be the case, our conclusions will need to be 
revised. 
 
 Our analysis also reveals an interesting relationship between altruism and 
impatience. In the evolution of consumption and bequests, altruism and patience play 
similar roles, and more of one can substitute for less of the other. In addition, altruism 
enhances the long run benefits of patience.  Since high altruism and low impatience 
confer the highest advantage in the long term (measured in terms of the level of 
consumption), such dynasties will have the strongest edge. Thus, in long-lived dynasties, 
altruism and patience will co-exist; evidence of one could suggest the presence of the 
other.    
 
 In the survival game, long-lasting genes appear to play an important role.  A 
dynasty whose members “carry” the altruism and patience traits that optimize the 
dynasty’s consumption rather than their own consumption has a better chance of 
withstanding the process of natural selection.  One reason why we are (somewhat) 
altruistic and (somewhat) patient is that we are descendants of dynasties that survived to 
the present.  Those who are wholly non-altruistic and wholly impatient belong to 
dynasties that no longer exist. 
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Appendix 
 
The Hamiltonian functions of the first maximization step , Ht, are  
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where 1tq denotes the adjoint variable. Maximizing Ht with respect to ct gives 
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The Euler equations, dtdqKH ttt
1=¶¶- , regulate the dynamics of consumption 
within each generation: 
 
( ) ( )
( ) dt
dc
cu
cur t
t
t =
¢¢
¢-d
 1+££ ntn . (A3) 
Note that tc , dtdct , and ( )tcu¢  are piecewise continuous functions; they are continuous 
over the time horizon stretching from 0 to N+1 except for t = 1,2,...,N. At the points of 
discontinuity, left and right derivatives, dtdct  as well as ( )tcu¢ , differ. In addition, tc  
admits two (closure) values, one referring to consumption of the old generation 
( )1-= tn  and the other referring to consumption of the new generation ( )tn = . 
 
 Suppose that ( ) ( )tt clncu = . Equation (A3) then becomes:   
 ( ) tt crdtdc d-=  1+££ ntn . (A4) 
The consumption planned by the individual for  generation n, for every n under 
consideration, is then 
 ( ) trnt ecc
d-=  1+££ ntn , ,,...,1,0 Nn =  (A5) 
where nc  is consumption at the beginning of the lifetime of generation n.  By 
substituting (A5) into (4) we find that cn satisfies  
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nt
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d . (A6) 
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The explicit value of cn is thus 
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Substituting (A7) into (A5) we obtain the explicit value of ct 
 ( )
( ) tr
nnt
e
ee
Ic d
dd
d -
-- úû
ù
êë
é
-
=
1
 Nn ,...,1,0= . (A8) 
Denote by gn  the bracketed term in (A8). From (2) and (A8), and recalling that 
( ) ( )tt clncu = , we can express the optimal Wn in terms of In and gn: 
 ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]ò
+
=
- -++=
1n
nt
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n dttrglnIlneW da
d  Nn ,...,1,0= . (A9)
  
The second order condition (the Legenre condition) is satisfied whenever the second 
derivative of the Hamiltonian with respect to ct is negative, for all t’s under 
consideration. It is easily verified that for our logarithmic utility function, the condition 
is indeed satisfied. 
 
 We now turn to the second step of the maximization problem - calculating the 
optimal values of In for all n under consideration, given the optimal Wn in (A9), which 
we express as ( )nn IW . The Lagrangian, L, of this time-discrete maximization problem 
is:  
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where m is the Lagrangian multiplier. The first order conditions are: 
 ( ) nnn IIW ¶¶=m  Nn ,...,1,0=  (A11a) 
and 
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The (N+1) equations in (A11a) can be summarized as follows: 
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The second order condition is satisfied whenever the second derivative of L with respect 
to In, for each n, is negative. It is easily verified that in our case, the condition is indeed 
satisfied. 
 
 Using (A11a) and (A11b) we can express In in terms of K0 as follows: 
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From (6) and (A12), the present value of the individual’s bequest, H1, is 
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da . (A13) 
When N is finite, the individual’s plan is partially time inconsistent.  While consumption 
within the individual’s lifetime, 10 ££ t , and the value of K1 are time consistent, each 
descendant (n > 0), if he were to replicate the individual’s measure of optimism, N, will 
need to revise his father’s plan by adding one more generation to his father’s plan, 
thereby altering the consumption program from the beginning of his lifetime and 
onwards.  However, when N tends to infinity, the individual’s plan is time consistent 
since the number of future generations in his planning horizon does not decline in the 
generational order. 
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Figure 1 
 
 
The evolution of inter-generational consumption of two dynasties with 
ri e -> da , 21,i =  and 21 aa > . Points A, B, C, and D portray the 
consumption of the dynasty with the higher altruism coefficient, at the 
beginning of generations zero, ( )1-v , v, and ( )1+v , respectively. Points 
D and C ,B ,A
~~~~
 portray consumption at the beginning of the same generations 
of the second dynasty. The lines connecting the consumption at the beginning 
of each generation’s lifetime, for either dynasty are imaginary; they do not 
depict intra-generational consumption. 
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